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1. IntroductIon 
Chile has been a leader in the worldwide trend toward liberalization 
of markets that has characterized recent decades. The liberalization 
process began in that country in 1975, spreading a decade later to 
the rest of Latin America. Chilean firms responded to the process by 
completely reformulating their competitive strategies, making a mul-
tiple set of choices regarding scope, assets, resources, capabilities 
and geographic markets. The most significant commitments made 
by these companies since the 1990s were their unprecedented out-
bound foreign direct investments (FDI) across Latin America.
Economists have long been addressing a number of important ques-
tions relating to the launch of competitive liberalization processes 
(see Bergara et al. (1998), Büchi (1993), Corbo et al. (1996), Ed-
wards (1995), Kennedy (1998), and Majluf and Raineri (1997)). Bu-
siness strategists, however, are just starting to examine the issues 
surrounding  how  companies  operating  in  countries  that  have  un-
dergone such reforms should respond to them. Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001) exemplifies a recent stream of research focusing on strategy 
and competition in developing countries that have adopted liberaliza-
tion policies (see also: del Sol (2002), Fisman and Khanna (1998), 
Ghemawat and del Sol (1998a), Ghemawat, Kennedy and Khanna 
(1998),  Ghemawat  and  Kennedy  (1999),  Ghemawat  and  Khanna 
(1998), Khanna (2000), Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999a, 1999b, 
2000a, 2000b), and Toulan (2002)).
Cuervo-Cazurra (2007) studies the sequence of value-added activi-
ties in the multinationalization of firms from Latin America. The same 
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executive summary
The article analyzes the foreign investment decision as a response to the economic liberaliza-
tion in Chile, using data obtained from a survey of 102 managers. I argue that the knowledge on 
strategies in response to reforms was a source of competitive advantage for Chilean firms, which 
enables them to successfully invest in other Latin American countries that were undertaking pro-
market reforms similar to the ones Chile did in the previous decade.
resumeN del artÍculo 
Este artículo analiza las decisiones de inversión en el extranjero en respuesta a la liberalización 
económica en Chile, utilizando datos recolectados a través de una encuesta a 102 gerentes 
generales. Argumento que el conocimiento sobre estrategia de negocios en tiempos de refor-
mas fue una fuente de ventaja competitiva para las empresas chilenas que  les permitió invertir 
exitosamente en otros países latinoamericanos que estaban realizando reformas económicas 
pro mercado similares a las que había realizado Chile en la década anterior.chILEAN REgIoNAL StRAtEgIES IN RESpoNSE to EcoNomIc LIBERALIzAtIoN
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author also shows (2008) that Latin American companies have been 
induced to establish foreign direct investment (FDI) after changes in 
their home countries stemming from structural reform spurred them 
to  upgrade  their  competitiveness  to  international  levels.  Cuervo-
Cazurra and Dau (2009a, 2009b) analyze how pro-market reforms 
impact the performance of domestic firms and subsidiaries of foreign 
firms operating in Latin America.
The present article, written in the context of this new body of re-
search, discusses the impact of the reforms in Chile and other Latin 
American countries on the competitive strategies of firms operating 
in  Chile.  These  strategies  include  their  investments  across  Latin 
America.
2. EconomIc rEforms across LatIn amErIca 
Over the last few decades Chilean firms have experienced 
a dramatic turnabout in the context in which they operate, 
which has changed from a local, regulated and protected 
government-led environment to a global and highly compe-
titive one. 
In the 1940s most Latin American countries embarked upon 
a trend toward increasing participation of the state in eco-
nomics affairs and a reduction in the role of competitive forces in 
determining the pattern of wealth creation and distribution. In the 
1980s this tendency was reversed as a growing number of political 
leaders moved to adopt the opposite development strategy. They in-
creasingly turned to free market forces to promote domestic and in-
ternational competition through the active participation of the private 
sector in the economy, retaining only a subsidiary role for the state 
(Edwards (1995).
Chile stands out as a pioneer in this new trend, implementing its 
liberalization process mainly during the 1970s and 1980s. It invol-
ved a coherent set of reforms that touched almost every aspect of 
economic life, covering prices, the public sector (including taxation), 
trade and exchange rates, the financial sector, the labor market, 
privatizations, utility regulation and anti-trust measures (including 
electricity and telecommunications) and social security. Other re-
form initiatives affected areas such as education, public health and 
public housing. One of the most novel aspects of these changes 
was the creation of a wide network of interwoven institutions expli-
citly designed to minimize the discretionary power of government 
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authorities. These institutions were created by statute law or consti-
tutional amendment, thus making them difficult to change (Corbo et 
al. (1996)).
This  liberalization  process  was  not  without  its  difficult  moments, 
however, surviving two deep recessions along the way. The first was 
in 1975, the very year the reforms began, when the GDP growth rate 
fell to –16.6%, and the second occurred in 1982 when growth dro-
pped to –10.7%. After a long process of trial and error, the economy 
started on a phase of sustained expansion in 1984 that lasted until 
1998. During this period the annual rate of growth averaged 6.9%. 
(Table 1 presents a number of macroeconomic and social indica-
tors).
Ten years after Chile initiated its economic liberalization, other Latin 
American countries began implementing similar reforms. Bolivia and 
Mexico launched their processes around 1985; Jamaica, Uruguay, 
and Trinidad and Tobago around 1987; Costa Rica around 1988; Gu-
yana, El Salvador and Venezuela around 1989; Argentina, Colom-
bia, Honduras and Nicaragua around 1990, Paraguay, Peru and Bra-
zil around 1991; and Guatemala and Panama around 1992. Though 
similar to the Chilean process, the particular characteristics, intensity 
and scope of the changes varied from one country to the next (see 
Edwards (1995)).
As liberalization spread across the region during the 90s, Chile pur-
sued bilateral free trade agreements to eliminate trade tariffs with as 
many countries as possible, signing treaties with Mexico (1991), Ve-
nezuela (1993), Colombia (1993), Ecuador (1994), Canada (1996), 
and Peru (1998). In 1996 Chile became an associate member of 
Mercosur, a free trade area that includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. More recently, Chile has signed free trade agreements 
with the European Union, the United States, and China.
3. rEsponsEs of chILEan fIrms
The Chilean liberalization and those that followed it in other Latin 
American countries dramatically changed the structure of the indus-
tries in which Chilean firms operated. The reforms integrated most 
of the country’s industries internationally through imports, inbound 
foreign direct investments, exports or outbound foreign direct inves-
tments. These four variables have grown vigorously since the Chi-
lean reforms began (see Table 2). chILEAN REgIoNAL StRAtEgIES IN RESpoNSE to EcoNomIc LIBERALIzAtIoN
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Table 1. Chilean macroeconomic indicators
YEAR
CuRREnt 
GnP PER 
CAPitA
(uS $)
POPuLAtiOn
(thOuSAnDS)
GDP 
GROwth
(%)
GROSS DOmEStiC 
invEStmEnt/ 
GDP
(%)
inFLAtiOn
(% ChAn-
GE in CPL)
unEmPLOYmEnt
(% OF LAbOR 
FORCE)
1975 920 10,413 -16.6 17 343.3 14.8
1976 910 10,566 5 198 12.7
1977 1,080 10,715 9.9 84.2 11.8
1978 1,350 10,862 7.8 37.2 14.2
1979 1,760 11,014 7.1 38.9 13.6
1980 2,160 11,174 6.6 31.2 10.4
1981 2,610 11,344 3.1 9.5 11.3
1982 2,200 11,523 -10.7 20.7 19.6
1983 1,790 11,710 0.5 23.1 14.6
1984 1,600 11,903 5.4 23 13.9
1985 1,410 12,102 3.2 17.2 26.4 12.0
1986 1,410 12,305 5.6 17.4 12.2
1987 1,550 12,513 6.6 21.5 11.0
1988 1,800 12,726 7.3 12.7 10.0
1989 2,060 12,948 10.6 21.4 8.0
1990 2,180 13,179 3.7 27.3 7.7
1991 2,390 13,419 8 18.7 8.3
1992 2,860 13,666 12.3 12.7 6.7
1993 3,190 13,916 7 12.2 6.5
1994 3,490 14,161 5.7 26.8 8.9 7.8
1995 4,160 14,395 10.6 8.2 7.4
1996 4,860 14,617 7.4 6.6 6.5
1997 5,020 14,828 6.6 6 6.1
1998 5.265 15,029 3.2 26.13 4.7 6.0
1999 4.923 15,223 -0.8 20.84 2.3 10.0
2000 4.841 15,412 4.5 20.73 4.5 9.7
2001 4.599 15,596 3.4 21.72 2.6 9.9
2002 4.316 15,776 2.2 21.32 2.8 9.8
2003 4.317 15,951 3.9 20.15 1.1 9.5
2004 4.928 16,124 6.0 19.29 2.4 10.0
2005 5.870 16,295 5.6 21.16 3.7 9.4
2006 7.990 16,452 4.6 19.02 2.6 8.1
2007 7.995 16,285 4.7 19.93 7.8 6.9
2008 9.400 16,454 3.2 23.99 7.1 7.7
Source: GNP per capita: World Bank and Nation Master (since 1998, Atlas method).
Population: Nation master 
GDP growth: Central Bank of Chile 
Gross Domestic Investment/ GDP: World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank, February, 1997 and Central Bank.
Inflation and Unemployment: INE (National Bureau of Statistics). pAtRIcIo dEL SoL
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Table 2. Chilean Exports, imports, Outbound and inbound Foreign investment 
(uS$ million)
ExPORtS FOb
OutbOunD 
FOREiGn 
DiRECt 
invEStmEnt
imPORtS CiF
inbOunD FOREiGn 
DiRECt invEStmEnt
YEAR
tOtAL
(uS $, 
CuRREnt 
YEAR)
% nOn 
COPPER
% tO 
LAtin 
AmERiCA
tOtAL
tOtAL
(uS $, 
CuRREnt 
YEAR)
% FROm 
LAtin 
AmERiCA
tOtAL
(uS $, 
CuRREnt 
YEAR)
% FROm 
LAtin 
AmERiCA
1975 1,590 45 -- 1,708 -- 35 11
1976 2,116 42 -- 1,655 33 45 21
1977 2,186 47 -- 2,417 33 28 3
1978 2,460 50 26 3,243 29 286 5
1979 3,835 51 25 4,708 25 304 8
1980 4,705 55 24 6,145 28 307 11
1981 3,837 55 22 7,318 22 427 12
1982 3,706 55 19 4,094 21 478 8
1983 3,831 51 12 3,171 26 208 7
1984 3,650 56 15 3,654 26 196 9
1985 3,804 53 15 3,229 26 167 11
1986 4,191 58 17 3,099 23 261 4
1987 5,303 58 17 3,994 24 541 4
1988 7,054 52 13 4,844 28 844 2
1989 8,080 50 12 6,595 27 981 2
1990 8,373 54 12 15 7,089 25 1,280 2
1991 8,942 60 14 192 7,456 27 982 5
1992 10,007 61 17 671 9,285 25 993 5
1993 9,199 65 20 742 10,189 23 1,739 4
1994 11,604 63 21 2,795 10,872 26 2,517 5
1995 16,024 60 19 4,158 14,642 27 3,027 3
1996 16,627 64 20 6,368 19,097 27 4,856 3
1997 17,870 63 21 4,731 20,800 28 5,227 3
1998 16,323 68 22 2244 19,853 29 6,039 3
1999 17,162 65 22 1417 15,962 30 9,230 2
2000 19,210 62 22 1217 18,466 33 3,040 4
2001 18,272 64 20 1347 17,799 35 5,023 2
2002 18,180 65 20 769 17,146 36 3,381 1
2003 21,664 64 16 459 19,322 38 1,236 -1
2004 32,520 55 15 1561 24,794 37 4,637 0.7
2005 41,267 54 15 1503 32,735 35 1,799 36
2006 58,680 44 15 2324 38,406 33 3,181 5
2007 67,666 44 15 4577 47,164 30 1,359 25
2008 66,456 51 17 2882 61,903 30 5,243 12
Source: Imports and Exports: Central Bank of Chile. Inbound foreign direct Investment: Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras. (Includes 
only investments made under DL 600.  Excludes those made under chapter XIX, which are approximately 12% of those under DL600). 
Outbound Foreign Direct Investment: Camara de Comercio de SantiagochILEAN REgIoNAL StRAtEgIES IN RESpoNSE to EcoNomIc LIBERALIzAtIoN
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This process posed serious threats for Chilean companies, but also 
opened up tremendous opportunities. Domestic competition subs-
tantially increased, as did foreign competition in the form of imports 
and inbound foreign direct investment. On the other hand, availabi-
lity of inputs also increased while their prices declined, the improve-
ments affecting not just raw materials and equipment but also capital 
for financing company projects. Furthermore, liberalization brought 
about increased domestic demand, the opening up of domestic in-
dustries previously out of bounds to private firms (such as electricity) 
and enormous opportunities to compete abroad, export all over the 
world and invest in other Latin American countries that have imitated 
Chile’s reforms. 
Chilean firms responded to the liberalization at home and elsewhere 
in Latin America by completely reformulating their competitive strate-
gies. They made a multiple set of choices regarding horizontal and 
vertical  scope,  organizational  capabilities,  assets  and  resources, 
alliances, and geographic scope. They also built a variety of world-
class tangible and intangible assets, most notable among the latter 
being management capabilities, and radically changed their geogra-
phic markets. 
Chilean companies also changed their emphasis from domestic to 
foreign markets (see Table 2). From 1975 to 1998, total exports grew 
at an average annual rate of 10% and non-copper exports increased 
at an average yearly rate of 12%. Total imports, meanwhile, rose at 
an average rate of 11% annually from 1976 to 1998. As for Chilean 
firms’ investments in foreign markets, they grew from virtually no-
thing to an outbound foreign direct investment of $6.4 billion in 1996, 
accounting for 9% of GDP.
Typically, these firms substituted imported raw materials and ma-
chinery for domestic products. Perhaps even more surprising is that 
they substituted foreign capital for domestic capital. Among other 
new practices, Chilean companies have since 1990 been issuing 
shares in the United States through American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs). As of 1997, ADRs had been issued for 24 Chile-based con-
cerns. This importation of capital substantially reduced its cost to 
Chilean firms and enabled them to undertake an enormous amount 
of investment abroad relative to the size of their home country.
Chilean  exports  and  imports  are  geographically  diversified  (see 
Table 3). The percentage of exports to Latin America, and imports 
and inbound foreign direct investment from that area to Chile, did pAtRIcIo dEL SoL
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not change substantially in the wake of the reforms (see Table 2). 
The free trade agreements Chile has signed with some Latin Ameri-
can countries, or groups of countries such as Mercosur, did not have 
a significant impact at the aggregate level (See Meller and Donoso 
(1998)).
The greater integration of the Chilean economy into that of Latin 
America has occurred mainly through outbound foreign direct inves-
tment, 97% of which went to Latin America between 1990 and 1998 
(see Table 2 and Table 4). This region has thus become very impor-
tant for Chilean firms. From 1990 to 1998, some 264 Chilean firms 
participated in this process of investing in foreign markets. This is a 
relatively large number considering the size of Chile’s economy.
Firms have two complementary ways of building sustainable compe-
titive advantage: development of capabilities, which involves many 
choices that are individually small; and making a commitment, which 
involves  a  few  relatively  lumpy  decisions  (see  Ghemawat  1999, 
chapter 5). The most significant commitments made by Chilean firms 
Table 3. Origin of Chilean imports and destination of Chilean 
exports 2008
ORiGin OF imPORtS DEStinAtiOn OF ExPORtS
European Union 27 12.7% 24.7%
China 12% 14.1%
United States 19.4% 11.6%
Japan 4.7% 10.4%
Mercosur 19.5% 9.7%
South Korea 5.6% 5.6%
Andean Community 10% 4.6%
Mexico 3.1% 3.2%
India 0.8% 2.5%
Canada 1.7% 2%
Central América 0.3% 1.1%
EFTA 0.6% 0.5%
P 4 0.3% 0.2%
Cuba 0.0% 0.1%
Other 9.3% 9.7%
Source: Relaciones Económicas Internacionales de Chile 2008 (Gobierno De Chile, Ministerio de 
relaciones económicas). chILEAN REgIoNAL StRAtEgIES IN RESpoNSE to EcoNomIc LIBERALIzAtIoN
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have been their unprecedented foreign direct investments across La-
tin America.
4. LIbEraLIzatIon know-how
In a paper co-written with Joseph Kogan (del Sol and Kogan (2007)) 
we showed that Chilean affiliates had a competitive advantage in La-
tin America during the 1990s. We verified this claim by comparing 
the profitability of foreign affiliates of Chilean publicly held companies 
operating in Latin America with the profitability of Latin America publi-
cly held companies for the period 1995 to 2002. Controlling for coun-
try, industry, year and size effects, we found that Chilean affiliates 
had higher ROE and a higher probability of returning positive profits. 
These results were most pronounced and most significant when our 
specification allowed the Chilean advantage to decrease with time 
(the model predicted no Chilean advantage by year 2002). By empi-
rically discarding alternative explanations based on factors such as 
risk and financing structure, we confirmed that the excess profitabili-
ty must have been due to some competitive advantage. 
Our hypothesis was that one source of competitive advantage was 
liberalization know-how, that is, knowledge of business strategy du-
ring economic reform (most of which occurred in the 1980s and early 
1990s) that was gained ten years earlier in Chile. This was difficult to 
corroborate, however, and we recognized the limitations of our analy-
sis, which was hampered by both lack of data and the ambitiousness 
of our claim. We thus concluded in our 2007 paper that more re-
search was necessary to establish this claim with greater certainty.
Table 4. Foreign investments of Chilean firms from 1990 to 2008 
according to destination country and economic sector
COuntRY
(87% tO LAtin 
AmERiCA)
PERCEntAGE 
OF tOtAL 
invEStmEnt
Argentina 42%
Peru 16%
Brazil 15%
Colombia 8%
Venezuela 3%
Other 16%
Source: Cámara de Comercio de Santiago. 
ECOnOmiC SECtOR
PERCEntAGE 
OF tOtAL 
invEStmEnt
Energy 32%
Industry 28%
Wholesale and 
retail 18%
Banking and finance 
Pension funds and 
insurance
5%
Other 17%pAtRIcIo dEL SoL
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In the present paper, we use survey data to measure liberalization 
know-how. In 1997 we consulted the senior executive officer of each 
of 102 Chilean companies in all sectors of the economy on how their 
business strategy changed in response to Chile’s economic reforms. 
As we explain below, the survey demonstrates that companies who 
made more changes to their overall strategy were also more likely to 
invest abroad. (In a regression on the decision to invest abroad that 
controlled for size and group membership, the coefficient for changes 
to overall strategy was significant at the 5% level). If many changes 
in overall strategy due to economic reform is an acceptable proxy for 
liberalization know-how, the results show that firms with more libera-
lization know-how were more likely to invest abroad. 
The conclusion that firms which invest abroad also tend to 
make many other changes has two other possible explana-
tions. First, it could be that some firms are intrinsically moti-
vated to change more (see Ghemawat and Ricart (1993)), 
perhaps because they have better managers or different ty-
pes of managers. On this explanation the strategy change 
index is a proxy for the firm’s tendency to change that is also 
reflected in the tendency to invest abroad more. 
The second explanation is that there is complementarity in 
actions so that the profitability of investing abroad is enhan-
ced by the other changes made. Porter (1996) elaborates on 
the importance of the fit or coherence among all the activities 
performed by a firm. This explanation is consistent with Ghe-
mawat et al. (1998, p. 26) who suggest that “the capacity to 
coordinate choices along multiple dimensions seems to be-
come more rather than less important in environments that 
have experienced competitive shocks.” To formulate their liberaliza-
tion response strategy, firms must find the set of choices that maxi-
mize competitive advantage over time in the new liberalized context. 
If the choices are interrelated, the strategy cannot be formulated 
simply by considering the individual choices independently but rather 
must focus on the impact of the whole set of choices, which differs 
from the sum of the individual impacts of each one. 
Although the strategy formulation of any firm requires coordination of 
choices, this coordination may become a major challenge in environ-
ments that have experienced a competitive liberalization. Ghemawat 
et  al.  (1998,  p.  23)  suggest  that  the  liberalization  process  brings 
about a virtual explosion in the set of possible business models, 
Although the strategy 
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requires coordination 
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and the impact of the whole set of choices become very complex to 
predict. In this context they suggest that traditional business strate-
gy constructs (such as Porter (1980 and 1985) and Hax and Majluf 
(1996)) must be reconsidered.
The empirical results presented in the next section also show that 
firms tend to invest abroad more if they are members of a Chilean 
group. This finding provides new evidence for the conclusion drawn 
in recent literature to the effect that collective action within groups 
may be valuable. In particular, the extensive literature by Khanna and 
various co-authors shows that while conglomerates are being dis-
mantled in Western economies, in emerging ones business groups 
add value (see, for example, Fisman and Khanna (1998), Ghemawat 
and  Khanna  (1998),  Khanna  (2000),  Khanna  and  Palepu  (1997, 
1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b), and Khanna and Rivkin (2001). Bel-
derbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) use a logit model to show that in Ja-
pan, membership of a group (keiretsu) helps to lower barriers faced 
by Japanese firms investing in Southeast Asia. 
The two conclusions taken together – that firms invest abroad more 
when they have access to the resources and capabilities provided by 
membership in a Chilean Group and when they have made greater 
changes to their overall competitive strategy – are consistent with 
Ghemawat’s “dynamic view of the firm” (Ghemawat, 1999). This view 
suggests that sustainable advantage depends on 1) the initial re-
source endowment, 2) “developing capabilities” by correctly making 
many small choices, and 3) making a few judicious “commitments” 
(relatively lumpy decisions) (see also Ghemawat (1991), del Sol and 
Ghemawat (1999) and del Sol (1999)). It also holds that initial re-
sources, small choices and commitments must fit together. Chilean 
Group membership may be interpreted as a proxy for resources, the 
strategy change index as a proxy for “developing capabilities” and 
the decision to invest abroad as a proxy for “commitment.”
In the next section we present an empirical analysis of Chilean firms’ 
responses to Latin America reforms between 1975 and 1997. As was 
already mentioned, the results showed that firms tended to invest 
abroad more the more changes they made to their strategies in di-
mensions other than investing abroad, and also displayed this ten-
dency if they were members of a Chilean group.pAtRIcIo dEL SoL
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Table 5. Responses to liberalization
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4. Change in suppliers* 74.5% 25.5% - 102
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80.2% 18.8% 1.0% 101
9. Managerial compensation 81.8% 17.2% 1.0% 99
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within the principal product line
68.6% 17.7% 13.7% 102
11. Use of project evaluation techni-
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14. Investment in technology 99.0% 1.0% 0.0% 100
15. Cost of the required technology 22.5% 11.2% 66.3% 98
16. Dependence on foreign technology 43.4% 44.5% 12.1% 99
17. Investment in capital goods 88.0% 11.0% 1.0% 100
18. Investment in marketing and 
distribution
87.2% 12.8% 0.0% 102
19. Access to financing 80.0% 16.5% 3.5% 85
20. (Real) cost of inputs (raw materials 
and capital goods)
19.8% 9.9% 70.3% 101
21. Geographic concentration of the 
production or operational establish-
ments in Chile
22.2% 44.5% 33.3% 99
22. Importance of proximity to natural 
resources in the principal product line
12.6% 85.3% 2.1% 95
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s 23. International focus of the firm in 
the principal product line
70.4% 27.6% 2.0% 98
24. International benchmark** 70.6% 29.4% - 102
25. Imports of inputs (primary mate-
rials and capital goods)
84.5% 12.4% 3.1% 97
26. Exports 65.8% 32.9% 1.3% 79
27. Company’s outbound foreign direct 
investments or investment abroad**
36.3% 63.7% - 102
* Change/no change choices
** Yes/no choiceschILEAN REgIoNAL StRAtEgIES IN RESpoNSE to EcoNomIc LIBERALIzAtIoN
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5. data and dEscrIptIvE statIstIcs
Obtaining data for emerging markets is a considerable challenge. 
For this study we collected our data directly through a questionnaire 
filled out by senior executive officers of 102 Chilean businesses in 
1997. We began with a list of the 500 firms with the largest sales vo-
lumes in 1994 as given in the “Chile Corporate Index 1996 Top 500” 
diskette published by South Pacific Mail and Dun&Bradstreet. This 
list excludes banks (and “financieras”, or money-lending institutions), 
pension funds, health insurance institutions (“Isapres”) and insuran-
ce companies. The same diskette also proved to be a reliable source 
for the names and contact information of chief executive officers of 
a subset of 340 firms. To build our sample we invited all 340 to parti-
cipate in the survey. Industrial engineering students at the Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Chile interviewed the CEOs of the firms that 
accepted our invitation. The companies generally did not answer all 
of the questions, and some values are therefore missing. The final 
sample included firms both listed and unlisted, private and stated-
owned and from every industry, with sales ranging from $ 10 million 
to $ 1.25 billion.
The 102 chief executives interviewed were asked how their strate-
gies had changed after economic liberalization in 27 different chan-
ge dimensions. Given that we were interested in the firms’ long-run 
choices we were fortunate to have carried out our survey in 1997, 
before the start of the downturn triggered by the Asian Crisis that 
led in 1999 to Chile’s first recession after 16 years of uninterrupted 
growth. Table 5 presents the descriptive results that were obtained.
The firms we surveyed tended to widen their horizontal and vertical 
scope. They generally increased the number of products they offe-
red, put more emphasis on services and broadened their target client 
base. They also tended to increase their vertical integration toward 
buyers and their vertical integration toward suppliers. The tendency 
to increase horizontal and vertical scope suggests that in the first 
period after liberalization the pressure to take advantage of oppor-
tunities to enter new businesses won out over the pressure created 
by the increased competition to focus on a few activities in which the 
firms enjoy a competitive advantage. (Khanna and Palepu (1997) ex-
plain why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets).
The organizational capabilities of the surveyed firms increased in all 
dimensions. Most of them deepened the professionalization of ma-
nagement, incentive compensation, managerial compensation, de-pAtRIcIo dEL SoL
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centralization of decision-making and the use of project evaluation 
techniques. They also invested in assets and resources, including 
technology, capital goods, marketing and distribution systems, and 
increased their access to financing while lowering technology and 
other input costs.
Finally, the survey data confirm the observation made earlier that the 
geographic markets of the firms changed toward more global ones. 
International focus, international benchmark practice, importation of 
inputs and exporting all increased for the majority of surveyed firms. 
In addition, 36% of the firms in the sample had foreign direct inves-
tments (Table 2 shows that no Chilean firms had invested abroad 
before 1990).
6. dEtErmInants of thE dEcIsIon to InvEst abroad: a 
LogIt anaLysIs
Table 5 shows the overall response of Chilean firms to liberalization. 
We focus on one of the most significant commitments associated 
with this response, which is the companies’ outbound foreign direct 
investments. A logit analysis is employed to explore the determinants 
of the decision to invest abroad using the collected data for the va-
riables in Table 5, which are the firms’ ownership (43% of the sam-
ple was owned by Chilean groups), their industrial classification, and 
their sales volumes. This last variable is included in all of the analy-
ses as a control variable. 
We quickly discovered that the firms which were members of a Chi-
lean group tended to invest abroad more than those which were not. 
We also investigated whether any of the first 26 variables in Table 
5, or any subset of them, determined the decision to invest abroad 
(variable 27), in order to establish whether investing abroad requires 
changes to be made in any other specific dimension of the strategy. 
We ran hundreds of combinations but could not find any clear indi-
vidual determinant of the decision to invest abroad among these 26 
variables. We tried by defining each variable as two dummies, one 
representing a decrease and the other an increase, and also by de-
fining each variable as one dummy, change (increase or decrease) 
or no change. 
We then built an index of overall strategy change (excluding inves-
tment abroad), defined as the number of variables among the first 
26 listed in Table 5 that change (increase or decrease) divided by 
the number of valid answers. Because firms did not always respond chILEAN REgIoNAL StRAtEgIES IN RESpoNSE to EcoNomIc LIBERALIzAtIoN
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to all of the questions, the number of valid answers was sometimes 
less than 26 (2 firms answered 21 questions, 1 firm 22, 6 firms 23, 
25 firms 24, 29 firms 25 and 39 firms all 26). We found that the index 
did determine the decision to invest abroad. Firms that make more 
changes to their overall strategy (excluding investing abroad) tended 
to invest abroad more. 
As was noted above, none of these 26 variables determines the de-
cision to invest abroad individually. It does not matter what changes 
firms make or in what direction. Among the firms that invested abroad 
the specific changes they made varied from one company to the next, 
but those that invested abroad tended to make more changes.
The statistical results of the base model are shown in Table 6. The 
variable representing Chilean group membership was highly signifi-
cant (p-value=0.004) and the one measuring strategy change was 
significant (p-value=0.024). To control by size, in the model presen-
ted in Table 6 we used the variable ln sales (natural logarithm of 
sales), which was significant (p-value= 0.073). (Louri et al. (2000) 
found that relative firm size was one of the variables contributing to 
the decision of Greek firms to invest abroad).
Table 6. Results of logistic model of the determinants of the 
decision to invest abroad
DEPEnDEnt vARiAbLE: COmPAnY’S OutbOunD FDi OR invEStmEnt AbROAD 
(0=nO, 1=YES)
Index of overall change in the strategy
5.022 *
(2.219)
Company that is a member of a Chilean 
group (0=no, 1=yes)
1.357 **
(0.468)
Natural logarithm of the sales of the company 
in 1996 in thousands of US dollars
0.411 +
(0.229)
Constant
-9.799 ***
(2.998)
Number of observations 102
LR chi2 22.74 ***
Log likelihood -55.436
Significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Standard errors appear in parenthesis. The index of 
overall change in the strategy of the firm is built from the 26 dimensions of change presented in Table 
5 (excludes investment abroad). It is equal to the number of variables that changed (increase or 
decrease) divided by the total valid answered variables (all firms interviewed have 21 or more valid 
answers).pAtRIcIo dEL SoL
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Chilean group membership and strategy change were found to be 
very robust as determinants of the decision to invest abroad. To es-
tablish this we first ran the model with ln sales and Chilean group 
membership, adding hundred of combinations of the first 26 varia-
bles of Table 5. In all models the Chilean group membership variable 
was significant (p-value<0.05) and in most of them highly significant 
(p-value< 0.01). In these runs the ln sales variable sometimes beca-
me not significant (p-value>0.1).
Table 7. matrix of correlations
StRAtEGY 
ChAnGE
SALES
ChiLEAn 
GROuP
OutbOunD 
FDi
Strategy Change 1
Sales 0.263 1
Chilean group 0.091 0.196 1
Outbound FDi 0.283 0.285 0.330 1
We also ran the base model with other functional forms for the sales 
variable. We ran the base model with 1) sales instead of ln sales, 
and 2) four ranges of sales using three dummy variables. In these 
two  specifications  the  sales  variables  became  not  significant  (p-
value>0.1), the strategy change variable become slightly more sig-
nificant (p-value = 0.012 and p-value=0.023) and the Chilean group 
member become much more significant (p-value = 0.002 in both ca-
ses). When we added dummies for the industries to the base model 
to control for them, the Chilean Group membership variable again 
become much more significant (p-value=0.002), while the strategy 
change variable continued to be significant (p-value=0.028). Adding 
the industry variable made the ln sales variable become not signifi-
cant (p-value=0.151). 
Aware that the definition of the strategy change index is somewhat 
arbitrary because it gives the same weight to all valid answers, we 
generated 26 random variables 100 times. This allowed us to genera-
te 100 different indexes of change, each one averaging the variables 
for which the firms gave responses with weights randomly selected. 
We then ran the base model with these 100 different strategy change 
indexes. The indexes for all 100 runs were significant (p-value<0.1), chILEAN REgIoNAL StRAtEgIES IN RESpoNSE to EcoNomIc LIBERALIzAtIoN
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and for 86 of them p-value<0.05. On all runs the Chilean group mem-
bership variable was highly significant (p-value<0.01) and on 6 of 
them the ln sales variable became not significant (p-value>0.1).
7. concLusIons
This paper studied the responses of Chilean firms to structural pro-
market reforms in Latin America. One response was their multina-
tionalization through outbound foreign direct investment across the 
region. The empirical results obtained showed that 1) firms that are 
part of a Chilean group tend to invest abroad more, and 2) firms that 
make more changes to their strategies in dimensions other than in-
vesting abroad tend to invest abroad more.
Our hypothesis is that one source of Chilean competitive advanta-
ge was liberalization know-how, that is, knowledge about business 
strategy during economic reform gained in Chile ten years before the 
country’s liberalization was emulated elsewhere in Latin America. 
This is a secondary benefit of leadership in economic reform. While 
any country in a given region that undergoes such changes will reap 
the domestic benefits, only the pioneer will gain a competitive edge 
in that region. These benefits are transitory, however, and must be 
nurtured by continuing leadership in reform. 
The results of this paper have interesting implications for academics, 
managers and policymakers. They provide a better understanding of 
the strategic repositioning of firms in the wake of Chile’s liberaliza-
tion in the 1970s and 1980s and should help corporations operating 
in countries where liberalization has arrived more recently to refor-
mulate their strategies. Business strategy in developing countries, 
even those adopting free-market reforms, is different from that for 
developed countries. The move towards free markets necessitates a 
period of transition where strategy is distinct both from approaches 
followed under the economic conditions existing prior to reform and 
those appropriate in the conditions expected after the reforms are 
complete.pAtRIcIo dEL SoL
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